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that the percentage requirements of Section 38 would be void.
Of course, the constitutional right of inspection does not embrace
the examination of books showing the action taken at shareholders' and directors' meetings, statements of receipts and disbursements, gains and losses, and other similar facts-the inspection of
which is essential before a thorough picture of the corporation's
activity may be had. In order to have a right to inspect these
books, the shareholder must meet the strict, and somewhat impractical, requirements of Section 38. In this regard the liberal
interpretation of the instant case achieves a fortunate and logical
result.
ROBERT

L.

ROLAND,

III

DONATIONS-TACIT REVOCATIONS OF DONATIONS INTER VIVOS-

An individual created a charitable trust to which he donated
several hundred lots. Subsequently the donor and donee trustee
agreed to sell to the defendant certain land, including the lots
previously donated. The donor joined with the donee in signing
the warranty deed tendered to the defendant, but the defendant
refused to accept the deed. Suit for specific performance followed. The defendant resisted upon the ground that the title
was not merchantable since the property was open to an action
of revendication by the forced heirs of the donor.' Held, that the
donor's joining with the donee in the signing of the warranty
deed resulted in a tacit revocation of the donation and furnished
a valid title which would not be subject to an action of revendication by the forced heirs of the donor. Atkins v. Johnston, 213
La. 458, 35 So.(2d) 16 (1948), Chief Justice O'Niell and Justice
McCaleb dissenting.
The Civil Code treats a donation inter vivos as a solemn contract perfected by the formal acceptance of the donee and irrevocable2 by the donor except for causes specified in the code. 3
1. The right of revendication is granted by Art. 1517, La. Civil Code of
1870, which provides, "The action of reduction or revendication may be
brought by the heirs against third persons holding the immovable property,

which has been alienated by the donee, in the same manner and order that
it may be brought against the donee himself, but after discussion of the
property of the donee."

Accord: Tessier v. Roussel, 41 La. Ann. 474, 6 So. 542 (1889), in which
the court recognized the right of the forced heirs to bring an action against
third persons holding immovable property that has been the subject of a

donation in excess of the disposable portion.
2. Art. 1468, La. Civil Code of 1870: "A donation inter aivos (between
living persons) is an act by which the donor divests himself, at present and
irrevocably, of the thing given, in favor of the donee who accepts it." (Italics

supplied.)
3. Art. 1559, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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However, in the early case of Scudder v. Howe 4 it was held that
the parties to a donation may conventionally rescind it. 5 In that
case the donor and donee executed a formal act of revocation
and the court held that when a donation has been mutually rescinded, and the property donated has been restored to the donor
in its entirety, the status which existed prior to the donation is
continued, and the donor's estate stands undiminished, just as if
no donation had been made.
In such a case the forced heirs of the donor have no grounds
for complaint because their eventual rights have been in no manner impaired. A subsequent alienation by the donor will not be
subject to attack by the forced heirs of the donor at his death.,
Assuming that the donor and the donee in the instant case had
expressly rescinded the donation by authentic act or by an act
under private signature and that the Scudder case was correct
in holding that a donation inter vivos may be conventionally
rescinde ,7 the instant case would be squarely in line with the
prior jurisprudence. Although the court, through Justice Hamiter, recognized that the Scudder case and the jurisprudence under
it require that the donor and the donee execute an act of revocation clearly manifesting an intent to revoke, it unequivocally
held that the donor's joining with the donee in signing the warranty deed resulted in a tacit revocation.
The case of Derby v. De Saix Corporation 8 was relied on to
show the significance of the donor's joining with the donee in
executing the act of sale of the donated property. There, the
4. 44 La. Ann. 1103, 11 So. 824 (1892).
5. The court used as its authority Art. 1901, La. Civil Code of 1870, which
provides: "Agreements legally entered into have the effect of laws on those
who have formed them. They cannot be revoked, unless by mutual consent

of the parties, or for causes acknowledged by law. They must be performed
with good faith." (Italics supplied.)
6. Scudder v. Howe, 44 La. Ann. 1103, 11 So. 824 (1892). Following a donation of immovable property, the donor and donee mutually rescinded. The
donor sold the property to a third person and donated the proceeds to the

original donee. The court held that the immovable was forever free from
claims of the forced heirs. Thus the court sanctioned a procedure which
permits the donor to place his immovable property beyond the reach of his
forced heirs.
7. See also Quirk v. Smith, 124 La. 11, 49 So. 728 (1909) where the court

said, "Neither the text of the Civil Code nor the case cited [referring to
Tessier v. Roussel, 41 La. Ann. 478, 6 So. 542 (1889)]

solves the question of

the legal effect of a conventional rescission of a completely executed donation inter vivos." While admitting that the French commentators consider
a donation inter vivos as irrevocable by the donor, the court, however, con-

cluded that "the proposition that the donor and the donee may by mutual
consent abrogate the donation whenever they deem proper seems to have
been too plain for controversy." Such a statement may be seriously challenged.
8. 201 La. 1060, 10 So. (2d) 896 (1942).
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donation was made subject to certain negotiations between the
donor and a third party. The donee was instructed by the donor
in the event of a sale to join in the act of sale. As Justice McCaleb
correctly pointed out in his dissent in the instant case, in the
Derby case the donor had never lost his interest in the property
and the donee was merely acting as an agent for the donor. In
the case under discussion, the donor unequivocally vested title
in the donee and when the donee joined in signing the warranty
deed, it was only warranting title against its own acts and not
the acts of the donor or anyone else.
In the absence of more pertinent authority, the court in the
present case relied heavily upon cases involving the revocation
of donations between married persons as authority for the proposition that the revocation of a donation may be tacit.9 Prior to
1942 donations between married persons were always susceptible
of being expressly or tacitly revoked. 10 Any act of the donor
which was inconsistent with the donation was considergd as having revoked it." This rule, embodied in Article 1749,12 was
founded upon considerations of public policy, 3 but in 1942 there
was a demand for a change of policy and the legislature repealed
Article 1749. The new rule contained in Act 187 of 1942 provides
that gifts by one spouse to the other "shall be irrevocable as fully
and to the same effect as if made to a stranger." (Italics supplied.) The enactment of this statute emphatically re-affirmed
the principle that donations inter vivos are fundamentally irrevocable and should not be susceptible of tacit or implied revocation. Since the cases cited by the court were all decided prior
to 1942, and before the repeal of Article 1749, it is clear that they
were not determinative of the problem presented in the instant
case.
Before the repeal of Article 1749,'14 certain federal taxes' 5
9. Succession of Hale, 26 La. Ann. 195 (1874); Abes v. Davis, 46 La. Ann.
818, 15 So. 178 (1894); Lavedan v. Jenkins, 47 La. Ann. 725, 17 So. 256 (1895).
10. Art. 1749, La. Civil Code of 1870.
11. Succession of Hale, 26 La. Ann. 195 (1874); Abes v. Davis, 46 La, Ann.
818, 15 So. 178 (1894); Lavedan v. Jenkins, 47 La. Ann. 725, 17 So. 256 (1895);
os
10 Aubry et Rau, Cours de Droit Civil Francais (5 ed. 1918) 441, n
644, 645;
os
15 Laurent, Principes de Droit Civil Francais (1893) 365-371, n
330-335.

12. La. Civil Code of 1870.
13. Howard v. United States, 40 F. Supp. 697 (E. D. La. 1941); 9 Duranton, Cours du Droit Francais (4 ed. 1944) 785, no 770; 2 Laurent, Cours du
Droit Civil (1887)

329, no 447.

14. La. Act 187 of 1942 followed the decision of Howard v. United States,
125 F. (2d) 986 (C.C.A. 5th, 1942), and was clearly for the purpose of placing
donations between spouses outside the scope of the federal taxes levied on
revocable gifts.
15. Revenue Act 1926, 302 (d) 1, as amended in 1934, 26 U.S.C.A. (Int.
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were collectible on donations between married persons because
they were susceptible of revocation at any time by any act of
the donor which proved inconsistent with the donation. Even
though the instant case is concerned with a donation inter vivos,
and not with a donation between married persons, it is submitted
that if the decision is followed and extended, and if the policy
declared in 1942 is again overlooked as it was in this case, the
result may well be that all donations inter vivos will be subject
to these federal taxes.
The court also held in the present case that no particular
form is prescribed for the revocation of a donation. It is true
that the Civil Code does not specify any particular rule, probably because a donation is treated as being irrevocable. Conceding the rule of the Scudder case to be correct, investigation
will lead to the conclusion that certain minimum requirements
should be met for the revocation of a donation of immovable
property. When a donation is revoked, the ownership of the
donor is reinstated as if there had been no donation. The revocation operates to transferthe land back to the donor. 16 In Quirk
v. Smith 17 the court, holding that a donation of real estate could
be rescinded by mutual consent, repudiated the idea that the
donee had to re-donate the land in order to return the property
to the donor. Since the transfer is made through a contractual
agreement and not through a donation from the original donee
to the original donor, there is no reason why the authentic act
should be essential to complete the transfer. However, Article
227518 specifically provides that every transfer of immovable
property must be in writing; hence it is imperative that there
at least be an act under private signature when the parties wish
to effect a revocation of a donation of real estate. In the instant
case the revocation so-called was contained in a warranty deed,
but the deed failed to show an express agreement between the
parties to revoke.
In view of the decisions, the articles of the Civil Code, and
Act 187 of 1942, all of which state that donations inter vivos are
fundamentally irrevocable, it would seem that a donation may
not be revoked even by mutual consent of the parties. But conceding that the parties may conventionally rescind, it appears
Rev. Code) § 811 (d) 1.
5th, 1942).
16. Scudder v. Howe,
17. 124 La. 11, 49 So.
18. La. Civil Code of

Howard v. United States, 125 F. (2d) 986 (C.C.A.
44 La. Ann. 1103, 11 So. 824 (1892).
728 (1909).
1870.
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that the court erred in holding that a donation may be tacitly
revoked. It seems that in every case the intention to revoke
should be clearly and expressly shown, and when the immovable
property is concerned, the agreement to revoke should be reduced
to writing.
LELAND H. COLTHARP, JR.

TAXATION OF VEssELs-For many years W. G. Coyle & Company, a Louisiana corporation, had conducted a marine terminal
and water traffic operations at New Orleans. In 1934 it began
also to operate as a towing concern on the Gulf Intracoastal
Waterway. In 1937 DeBardeleben Coal Corporation, a Delaware
corporation, acquired all of the assets of the Louisiana corporation through merger. The marine terminal and towing operations
were continued in the trade name used by the Louisiana corporation for those enterprises. These commercial enterprises were
carried on in substantially the same manner before and after the
merger. At all times New Orleans was the principal operating
base of twelve vessels;' and they were never in state of Delaware. Many factors clearly distinguished it from their other ports
of call, each accentuating the greater importance of New Orleans
in the operation of the vessels. 2 Each vessel was regularly engaged in interstate commerce.3 None of the vessels ever visited
1. This note is not concerned with the problem presented by eight additional barges which were operated solely within Alabama and were important in the decision of several points of the case. The discussion will be
limited to those vessels engaged in interstate commerce between New Orleans and ports in other states. See American Barge Line Co. v. Cave, .68 F.
Supp. 30, 40 (E.D. La. 1946).
2. See the trial judge's findings of fact, Nos. 8, 9, 10, 11, 14 (Id. at 51).
He found that the Delaware corporation had continued the operations of
the Louisiana corporation without material change or interruption, using
the name "Coyle Lines" to benefit from the business reputation of the Louisiana corporation. New Orleans was found to be the location of the main
oflce from which Coyle Lines were controlled, the only machine and repair
shop, the place where crews were paid and took their weekly twenty-four
hour lay-off, the place where vessels were usually fueled, and the place where
all scheduled general repairs or minor "voyage" repairs were made. The
Coyle Lines common carrier water transportation business was operated
out of New Orleans with two Coyle Lines tugs and ten Coyle Lines barges,
to which it added approximately eight chartered tugs and many barges,
depending upon the tonnage offered for transportation.
3. Id. at 40. It also affirmatively appears from the opinion of the trial
judge that each of the vessels were absent from the port of New Orleans
for the greater part of the year. Since New Orleans was the only Louisiana
port of consequence in the operation of the lines, it would seem to follow,
though there is no express finding of fact on that point, that the vessels
were each beyond the borders of Louisiana for the greater part of the year.
Taking the year'1944 as typical, the court found that of the total number

